Volume 13, Number 1, April 2002

The intricate artwork that adorns bamboo artefacts from New Caledonia is made up of a restricted range of basic elements. By combining and recombining these elementary shapes—chevrons, triangles, pentagons—the artists have produced narratives of a potentially high documentary quality. Before these narratives can be incorporated into the history of the country, however, it is necessary that the polysemic richness of the visual motifs and their transfigurative power be understood. This article is a small step in that direction.

Naming systems play a prominent role in discussions of land tenure by Aboriginal people. Reference to one area of land and its owners is most commonly in terms of name ‘X’, whereas reference to another area of land and its owners is most commonly made in terms of name ‘Y’. Much of the analytical literature examines how these names refer to groups of people. There is considerable dispute as to whether the reference of these names suffices to determine disjoint groupings of owners that can be described by the term ‘clan’.
This paper proposes that the analysis of linkages between names and areas of land should have priority over the analysis of linkages between names and groups of people. The evidence shows that the attachment of names to areas of land is more stable and consistent than their attachment to groups of people. There are differences in the ways that names attach to the landscape, and these differences are significant—they determine whether or not more than one name from the same system may be attached to an area of land.
This paper focuses on two areas of Australia: the northern Kakadu-Oenpelli area and the Timber Creek area (both in the Northern Territory). It shows that naming systems identify disjunctive areas of land as the targets for claims of primary ownership in both areas. These disjunctive areas may reasonably be described with the translation term ‘estate’. In the northern Kakadu-Oenpelli area, corresponding to these estates, there are disjunctive groupings of owners, which may be termed ‘clans’. However, groupings of owners are not clearly disjunctive in the Timber Creek area, and there is little motivation for using the term ‘clan’.
This paper proposes that this difference reflects a general pattern in Aboriginal Australia, with naming systems stably and consistently identifying ‘estates’ across much of the continent. They do not identify ‘clans’ with equivalent stability and consistency.

The question of what role beliefs play in the description of a culture or a religious system, and whether beliefs as such can be ‘tested’, arose during a dramatic State Royal Commission into an Aboriginal sacred site claim in South Australia in 1995 focused on the proposed Hindmarsh Island-Goolwa bridge. In this paper I examine some aspects of the legal and anthropological defence of the claim and suggest that insufficient distinction was made between belief as an interior subjective state, and as a gloss on a certain disposition to behave that is conventionally defined. Further, the issue of the social testing of belief statements was obscured by re-phrasing the Royal Commission as an attack on the Aboriginal claimants’ right to religious belief. Appealing to Needham, Sperber and Quine, and utilising comparative analysis of a similar court case in North America, I suggest an anthropological approach to belief that side-steps some of the critical problems in the anthropology of religion created during the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Royal Commission.

In this paper I seek to cast light on a particular aspect of the background for the political crisis in Fiji in 2000. Before and during this crisis politicians and media kept hammering on the theme of Fijians’ inferior position in the economic life of the country. The public argument in Fiji further emphasised the success of the Indians and that this in turn further marginalised the Fijians. It was frequently asserted that the Fijians needed affirmative action in order to get on in the modern business world and that the new Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry was favouring the Indians.
The theme of this article is that the rhetoric used prior to and during the crisis was a reiteration of a longstanding discourse in Fiji. Similar arguments were used in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly as a means of legitimating the coup in 1987, and during the regime of Rabuka in the 1990s. My primary concern here is not to document the success or failure of Fijians in modern business enterprises, but rather to make clear how the dichotomy of business–vanua comprises a variety of concerns and doubts related to modernisation, urbanisation, ethnicity, belonging, values and choices. By constantly discussing and exposing the interface between business and vanua, money and land, people seek to make sense of complex urban situations. The ongoing debate may be looked upon as a ‘work of coherence’ in Hannerz’ terms, and as such is a debate on modernity.

Ethnography may lie at the heart of anthropological methodology but its claims are contested. Feminist anthropologists in particular have debated the challenges a critical academic discipline poses for a consciously politicised positioning of the ethnographer, examining the constraints this might impose on the ethnographic project. Such dilemmas are compounded in the context of advocacy work. This critique of a feminist ethnography (Diane Bell’s Ngarrindjeri Wurruwarrin), which emerged from advocacy work in a litigious Australian context, suggests that the truth demands of advocacy work sit uneasily with both the partiality of critical ethnography and the politics of the feminist project.

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